Can Washington Broker Peace in Ukraine Without Redrawing Europe’s Security Order?

The Abu Dhabi talks produced an agreement to exchange prisoners. A durable peace will require commitments that Ukraine accepts and that Washington and European governments can honour.

For families waiting for prisoners of war to come home, Abu Dhabi produced something worth having. Russia and Ukraine agreed to a large exchange as two days of U.S.-mediated talks ended on 11 November. The numbers were still to be finalised. The delegations left without announcing a ceasefire or a territorial settlement, and attacks continued during the talks. (Associated Press · Reuters)

Washington should build on that agreement by keeping three questions distinct. The first is how to stop the fighting. The second is how to protect Ukraine if Russia attacks again. The third is whether any agreement should change the security arrangements of other European countries. For a Ukrainian household facing another winter of strikes on the power grid, a pause in attacks has immediate value. Keeping the lights on through winter takes an agreement that can withstand the first serious breach. (Reuters reporting on 10 November)

A ceasefire and the question of territory

Russia still demands that Ukraine surrender the whole Donbas, including areas Moscow has failed to capture. Kyiv has rejected that demand. A ceasefire could freeze military positions while leaving the legal status of the territory open. In 2022, the UN General Assembly called on states to withhold recognition of Russia’s attempted annexations. A line used to monitor a truce should preserve that distinction. Ukraine would have to agree to any terms affecting its territory. (Reuters · UN General Assembly resolution)

A first agreement could cover a defined pause in attacks on energy infrastructure. It would need to specify what is covered, how incidents are recorded and who investigates violations. A mechanism that can attribute breaches would give mediators evidence to work with when each side blames the other. The January Paris Declaration already envisaged U.S.-led monitoring and a commission to address breaches. Turning that proposal into an agreed procedure would make a wider ceasefire more credible. (Paris Declaration)

Humanitarian measures can proceed on their own timetable. The two delegations can agree on lists and dates for prisoner returns while talks on territory continue. Families will judge the exchange by who comes home. Carrying it out would show that the parties can honour a specific commitment with a measurable result. A wider ceasefire would require more extensive monitoring and the willingness to investigate violations even when the findings are politically uncomfortable.

What a guarantee outside NATO would require

A credible guarantee outside NATO requires governments to commit in advance to action they can sustain. Article 5 of NATO’s treaty obliges allies to assist an ally under armed attack and leaves each to decide how. Under Article 10, an invitation to join requires unanimous agreement. (North Atlantic Treaty)

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia reaffirmed its commitment to respect Ukraine’s existing borders. That history gives Kyiv good reason to ask how a future commitment would be enforced. (Budapest Memorandum)

The Paris Declaration offers a starting point. It puts Ukraine’s own armed forces at the centre of deterrence, envisages long-term support and a multinational force, and proposes binding commitments in the event of another Russian attack. The UK says planning for the force is continuing under British and French leadership. The force has a separate role from ceasefire monitoring. The next task is to turn those plans into obligations that governments have authorised and funded. (Paris Declaration · UK planning update)

Ukraine should be able to read an agreement and know who would respond to a breach, how quickly consultations would begin, and what assistance each partner had authorised. European governments would need to secure multi-year funding, and Washington would need to specify the support it was prepared to provide. The commitments would have to survive changes of government. They would also lose much of their value if the settlement left Ukraine with armed forces too constrained to defend the country while its partners decided how to respond.

The agreement should distinguish assistance that could begin immediately from measures that would require a further vote or decision. A partner might commit to keeping funds available for agreed support while reserving other decisions for its legislature. Ukraine should know both timelines before it signs. Russia would also be able to assess them. Ambiguity over who can authorise help gives Moscow room to test the agreement through actions that fall short of a full-scale invasion.

Europe has commitments of its own to make

European governments, the EU and NATO were involved in separate coordination in Abu Dhabi with Ukraine and the United States. They were outside the direct trilateral talks with Russia. That matters because the parties being asked to enforce a settlement must help write the commitments they will be expected to carry out. European governments will have to decide what they can fund, whether they will contribute to a multinational force and how they will respond if the agreement breaks down. (Abu Dhabi coordination statement · Reuters)

There is also a reason to keep wider European security talks on a separate track. Before its full-scale invasion, Moscow demanded that NATO withdraw forces from countries that joined after 1997. A bargain that revived such terms would affect allies far beyond Ukraine. Negotiations on military transparency, exercises or risk reduction could have value. The governments whose security would be affected would need to take part and agree to the terms. (Reuters)

Washington’s role as mediator gives it a channel to Moscow. Its role as a potential guarantor would entail commitments of its own. European partners need clarity about what they can count on from the United States so they can decide what to provide themselves.

Washington can make progress by helping the two sides carry out the prisoner exchange and by pressing for a ceasefire that can be verified. In parallel, Ukraine and its prospective guarantors should settle who would do what if Russia resumed the war. Europe’s wider security arrangements deserve their own negotiations with the countries that would live under them. The most consequential result of Abu Dhabi would be a process that lets Ukrainians see a credible prospect of peace and know how it would be protected.

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